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ABSTRACT

The 2001 Symposium on Corporate Governance,
Stakeholder Accountability, and Sustainable Peace explored
possible connections between corporations and sustainable
peace. The Symposium's discussions were inspired by the view
that liberal values and democratic principles help prevent
violent conflict in society. In this Article, the Author discusses
the notable ideas expressed in the symposium, including those
articulated by Professors Timothy L. Fort, Cindy A. Schipani,
The Author posits that formal
and Terry M. Dworkin.
programs enabling employees as owners and participants in
their corporations may promote employee voice and improve
corporategovernance. Financialparticipationrights, decisionmaking participation rights, and "entry" and "exit" rights are
the three basic dimensions of such programs. The Author
asserts that corporations will necessarily consider the
viewpoints of employees and their communities as a consequence
of employee ownership and participationprograms, which will
ultimately contribute to sustainablepeace in society.
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GROUNDINGS OF VOICE IN EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
"Today on the world's horizon are seen the forces of political and
economic reaction . . . fomenting revolution against private capitalism
1
and free enterprise which flourished until thrown out of equilibrium."

I. INTRODUCTION

The 2001 Symposium on Corporate Governance, Stakeholder2
Accountability, and Sustainable Peace (2001 Peace Symposium)
explored possible connections between corporations and sustainable
peace. In scholarship that resulted from that conference, Professors
Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. Schipani argued that corporations can,
within their workplaces, model peaceful societies and, thereby,
increase disputants' abilities to reach accord without resorting to
violence. 3 Similarly, Terry M. Dworkin observed that whistle-blowing
can encourage governance practices that enhance the role of the
individual at the workplace, as well as foster communication and
Similarly, Fort and
conflict resolution across diverse groups. 4
Schipani postulated that how a corporation treats its stakeholders
might influence local culture in ways that either contribute to or
undermine sustainable peace. 5 Many of the ideas that were discussed
in the 2001 Peace Symposium drew upon evidence that liberal values
and democratic principles appear to play positive roles in avoiding
violent conflict. 6 This Article hypothesizes that formal programs
enabling employees as owner-participants in their corporations may
promote employee voice, a topic that is of interest to Professors Fort,
Schipani, Dworkin, and other peace scholars.
This Article analyzes how specific types of plans-employee
ownership and participation plans-affect the employee's voice within
the corporation, the corporation's interactions with stakeholders, and
the community's attitudes toward the corporation. This Article does
not enter into, much less settle, the extensive debate on the pros and
cons of employee ownership and participation programs. In addition,

SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM. ON FIN., SURVEY OF EXPERIENCES IN PROFIT
1.
SHARING AND POSSIBILITIES OF INCENTIVE TAXATION, S. REP. NO. 76-610, at 17 (1939)
[hereinafter VANDENBURG REPORT].
2.
The Symposium was sponsored by The William Davidson Institute at the
University of Michigan Business School, the Initiative for Social Innovation Through
Business of the Aspen Institute, and Dr. Erika Parker. The Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law printed the papers from the conference as well as remarks by
several speakers.
Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, An Overview of the
Symposium, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 379-80 (2002).
3.
Id. at 387.
4.
Terry M. Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MNCs, and Peace, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 459 (2002).
5.
Fort & Schipani, supra note 2, at 381-82.
6.
Id. at 381.
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it does not delve deeply into the economics, organizational behavior,
and other literature that attempts to evaluate the quantifiable effects
of employee ownership and participation programs. There has been a
significant amount of that type of research on a worldwide basis,
much of it with contradictory or incomplete results. One of the few
points on which researchers appear largely in agreement is that
combining share ownership with decision-making participation is
more likely to be effective than utilizing either share ownership or
decision-making participation alone. 7 While the measurable effects of
these programs on firm performance, employee attitudes, and
community is certainly relevant to the question of sustainable peace,
it is not the purpose in this Article to summarize or evaluate this
extensive body of literature. Instead, it takes the initial steps in
searching for potential links between employee voice enabled by
ownership and participation programs, corporate governance and the
role of the modern day enterprise, and sustainable peace.
Advocates of employee ownership and participation programs
have long argued that employee ownership programs can be
important in enhancing industrial peace. 8 In fact, this Article's
opening quotation is neither a response to the events of September
11, 2001, nor does it derive from Saddam Hussein's alleged interest in
developing weapons of mass destruction. Rather, the quotation comes
from the 1939 Vandenburg Report, which studied profit sharing as a
response to World War I and the social injustice produced by the
9
Great Depression.
Employee ownership and participation programs, however, do
not lack for critics. A key architect of one program stated, 'You can't
confuse ownership and being an employee. At home, a shareholder.
At work an employee." 10 This highlights the contradictory role
workers can be asked to play when they become involved in these
programs. Economic studies have questioned the efficacy of the
programs, 11 social scientists have critiqued specific programs, 12 and
13
employee-owned enterprises are not without problems.

7.
8.
9.

D'Arcimoles & Tr6bucq, infra note 11, at 3.
See infra Part II.A.
VANDENBURG REPORT, supra note 1, at 16-17.

10.

CHARLES S. VARANO, FORCED CHOICES 104 (1999) (quoting Harvey Sperry,

Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher from the transcript of The Great Weirton Stee(a)l, First Run
Features, 1984, at 105).
See, e.g., Charles-Henri D'Arcimoles & St6phane Tr6bucq, The Effects of
11.
ESOPs on Performance and Risk: Evidence from France 3 (2002), at
http://ocean.st.usm.edu/%7Emklndnstbrussels/TREBUCK.pdf (discussing research on
the economic effects of ESOPs).
12.

See VARANO, supra note 10, at 104.

Perhaps the best known recent example is United Airlines, Inc. (UAL),
13.
which is majority owned by employees. For a discussion of employee ownership at
UAL, see infra text accompanying notes 204-15.
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Various models of employee ownership and participation
programs have developed in the United States and throughout the
world. Part II explores the history of employee ownership programs,
and how they were accepted by corporations and strengthened
through legislation.
Proponents have long held the view that
ownership and participation programs could help achieve peace
within the industrial workplace. Three dimensions of employee
ownership programs are discussed in order to conceptually probe
whether such programs can positively affect intra-corporation
associational dynamics and community relationships.
Those
dimensions are: (1) governance rights, (2) cash flows, and (3)
individualism. Part III examines a small subset of the country-level
regulation of employee ownership and participation programs. In
addition to specific legislative provisions, one firm-level example of
employee ownership and participation is discussed as well.
Part IV is dedicated to an initial exploration of the connection
among current ownership and participation programs, employee
voice, corporate governance, business ethics, and sustainable peace.
First, this Section discusses whether employee voice derived from
ownership and participation might have a role in addressing the need
for monitoring in modern corporations, where ownership and
management are bifurcated. 14 Second, it considers whether employee
involvement through ownership and participation may have any
implications for the ability of corporations to model democratic
principles.
Finally, this Section addresses whether enabling
employees as owner-participants could provide any opportunities for
reducing the "sources of conflict,"1 5 which Fort and Schipani
identified in their peace scholarship.

II. HISTORY AND DIMENSIONS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AND
PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS

This Section begins by examining some of the views that were
developed during earlier times with regard to employee ownership
and participation programs. The periods following the World Wars
and during the Depression in the 1930s are particularly interesting.
Policymakers of those times recognized the challenges inherent in

14.
See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Conceptions of the Corporationand the Prospects of
Sustainable Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 437, 446-51 (2002) (discussing various
conceptions of the corporation, including the nexus-of-contracts conception); Lee A.
Tavis, Corporate Governance and the Global Social Void, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
487, 528-32 (2002) (same).
15.
Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of the Corporation in
FosteringSustainablePeace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 416 (2002).
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achieving peace and maintaining democracy in the face of severe
social and economic pressures.
The Section progresses by exploring fundamental factors
underlying employee ownership and participation programs.
By
unpacking those programs, it becomes possible to consider the
connections among formalized programs that are superficially quite
different.
Examining the constituent elements also makes
transparent the role of entry and exit rights in affecting the scope of
employee voice developed through ownership and participation
programs.
A. Anti-war and Harmony as Motivating Ideals
This is not the first time that connections between employee
ownership and participation and sustainable peace have been
examined. In fact, there is a long history of linking employersponsored financial participation schemes with democratic principles
and workplace harmony. In 1794 a glass works in Pennsylvania
established the first recorded profit sharing plan in the United States
because, as in the words of the owner, "'the democratic principle upon
which this nation was founded should not be restricted to the political
processes but should be applied to the industrial operations as
well."' 16 Albert Gallatin, the founder of that plan, was neither
financially nor politically naive. In fact, he later served as Secretary
of the Treasury under both Presidents James Madison and Thomas
17
Jefferson.
In the early 1900s, U.S. businesses increased their use of profit
sharing and stock ownership plans. That ended with the stock
market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Depression." In the wake of
World War I and the poor stock market performance in the 1920s, a
subcommittee of the U.S. Senate held hearings in 1938 on profit
sharing. 19 The resulting report, named the Vandenburg Report after
the subcommittee's chair, Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg, discusses
the "mass discontent" then existing in the United States, 20 the
philosophy of profit sharing,"2 1 and the views of employers and
employees on profit sharing. 22 The Vandenburg Report summarizes
the group's conclusions by stating the following: "The committee finds
that profit sharing, in one form or another, has been and can be

16.
PROFIT SHARING MANUAL 16-17 (Joseph B. Meier ed., 1957) (quoting Albert
Gallatin).
17.
Id. at 16.
18.
Id. at 18.
19.

VANDENBURG REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.

20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 58-68.
Id. at 101-26.
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eminently successful, when properly established, in creating
employer-employee relations that make for peace, equity, efficiency
and contentment. We believe it to be essential to the ultimate
''23
maintenance of the capitalist system.
In one of the most interesting historical intersections between
and
sustainable
peace,
the Profit
financial
participation
Sharing/401(k) Council of America traced its creation to a Rotary
Club meeting in Orrville, Ohio in 1947. The speaker was Robert S.
Hartman, a Professor of Philosophy at Wooster College. Professor
Hartman told the gathering that profit sharing "might prevent a
recurrence of the 'hate and strife' that had engulfed the world in
24
war."
Professor Hartman's perspective was probably affected by his
26
25
childhood in Germany in the 1910s, seeing his father go off to war,
escaping Nazi Germany in 1933,27 and believing himself to be under
surveillance by the Nazis for a number of years even after he left
Germany. 28 Although Professor Hartman did not remain active for
long after the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council was established, 29 his
interest in peace continued throughout his lifetime. In fact, he was
nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973.30
The belief that employee ownership and participation might lead
to sustainable peace, or at least to increased social justice and
harmony, was not limited to the United States during the early
1900s. General Charles de Gaulle began advocating profit sharing in
France during the 1940s as "a 'third way' between capitalism and
socialism, towards
social
harmony
and labor-management
cooperation." 3'
More broadly, the use of work councils, which
involved non-financial participation, throughout Western Europe
developed in the post-war period in response to the "need for
mechanisms of representation, social peace, and labor-management
'3 2
cooperation in the rebuilding of post war economies.

23.

Id. at 5.

24.
VIRGINIA DAWSON, MAKING CAPITALISM DEMOCRATIC: THE CREATION OF
THE COUNCIL OF PROFIT SHARING INDUSTRIES 2 (1947) (undated pamphlet distributed

by the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America) (copy on file with the author).
25.

HARTMAN
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See generally ROBERT

S. HARTMAN,

FREEDOM TO LIVE,

THE ROBERT

STORY (Arthur R. Ellis ed., 1994).
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 38.
DAWSON, supra note 24, at 8.
HARTMAN, supra note 25, at 194.
Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, France: The Driving Force of Comprehensive

Legislation, in

WORKERS' FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION:

EAST-WEST EXPERIENCES 55

(Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead et al. eds., 1995).
32.
Lowell Turner, International and Comparative: Works Councils:
Consultation, Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations, 50 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 707, 707 (1997).
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B. ParticipationDimensions of Employee Ownership
Employee ownership can be unpacked along three dimensions
that may affect employee voice. Due to the nature of employee
ownership, each of these dimensions may exist along a continuum.
The two obvious facets of corporate ownership to affect voice are the
rights owners receive to participate in the governance of the
enterprise and to share in the financial success of the enterprise. 3 3 A
third dimension becomes important in the context of various
programs that enable employee ownership, hence allowing a voice in
the enterprises where they work. Unlike the landscape of many
stockholder situations, those programs may limit or negate the right
of employees to make an individual decision about "buying" and
"selling" shares. This dimension will be referred to as "entry" and
"exit" rights.
1. Ownership and Governance Rights
Ownership in a corporate enterprise typically brings with it
rights to exercise certain specified governance prerogatives. In the
U.S. approach, for example, equity shareholders tend to have rights
to elect members of the board of directors. It is through these types of
governance rights that shareholders are able to directly monitor
corporate management.
In employee ownership programs, employees may derive similar
or equivalent governance rights from formal share ownership. Yet,
other avenues of participation in corporate governance may be
For instance, some companies have
available to employees.
established quality circle programs 34 or other formal mechanisms to
Participatory
involve employees in workplace decision-making.
programs that are not based on equity ownership tend to be
circumscribed in the scope of decisional authority afforded to
employees; for example, manufacturing employees having input over
the types of tools used to perform their jobs. When compared to a
right to vote for corporate directors or against an extraordinary
corporate transaction, the rights established in workplace
participation programs may appear insignificant. On the other hand,
such programs provide employees an avenue to contribute their
specialized knowledge. These programs may allow for more frequent
opportunities for participation than the generally episodic voting

33.
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions:
The Case of United and the Airline Industry, in EMPLOYEES & CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 317, 318 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark Roe eds., 1999).
For a discussion of the operation of and the legal challenges to quality
34.
circles, see Mark Fox & Fred Naffziger, From Illegal to Legal-Quality Circles Come
Full Circle, 35 Bus. L. REV. 1 (2002).

20031

GROUNDINGS OF VOICE IN EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

rights that are inherent in share ownership. In optimal situations,
employees may be able to correlate their participation with the
results more quickly and directly than in traditional shareholder
votes.
In contrast to workplace programs that open participation to
non-stockholders, some employee stock ownership programs limit
For example, the Employee Stock
employee governance rights.
Ownership Plan (ESOP) at Weirton Steel 35 stripped employees of
many voting rights associated with stock held by the ESOP for the
first five years of the ESOP's existence. 36 Similarly, the employees'
ownership power may be affected by factors such as the proportion of
employees owning the company's stock and the cohesiveness of the
employee population.
When considering the correlations among employee participation
in corporate governance, business ethics, and sustainable peace, it is
useful to recognize that employee ownership provides one basis for
participation in corporate governance. Yet, depending upon the
configuration of ownership programs, the strength of employee voice
supported by any given program, and, thus, employee governance
rights, may vary tremendously. Depending upon what types of
governance rights are of value, it is also possible that those rights
may be acquired without employee share ownership.
2. Ownership and Financial Participation Rights
Employee financial participation is another factor of ownership
that may occur across a spectrum. Shareholders typically reap the
benefits of a company's success through their receipt of dividend
distributions and any increase in share value. Employees' acquisition
of their company's stock permits them to participate financially on a
Therefore, financial
proportional basis with other owners.
participation may bring with it incentives for employees to exercise
their voice on important corporate decisions.
Conversely, employer-sponsored benefit programs can enable
employees to participate financially in the success of the company
without the employees becoming actual stockholders. Phantom stock
programs can replicate the financial benefits of share ownership
without providing any governance rights. In addition, profit sharing
as experienced by equity shareholders can be established for
employees according to a formula that attempts to track the
company's results; profits may be awarded based on the achievements

35.
For a more extensive discussion of this ESOP, see infra text accompanying
Part III.C.
36.
VARANO, supra note 10, at 138-39.
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of a particular division or other work group, or even based on
individual accomplishment within the company.
3. Ownership and Entry and Exit Rights
The third dimension of employee ownership is "entry" and "exit"
rights. As explained earlier, these rights refer to an employee's
ability to decide whether or not to acquire corporation stock (entry
rights) and the employee's ability to sell corporation securities and
receive the sale value in current cash (exit rights). Consider an
employee ownership program that distributes securities to the
employee population without giving them the choice to receive cash or
other compensation in lieu of the securities. Employees have entry
rights in the sense that they automatically participate in the
distribution.
However, an employee who has no interest in
ownership, perhaps because current consumption needs negate any
voluntary trade-off between current and deferred compensation, has
no right to make an individual determination on entry. The lack of
entry rights may affect the value the employee places upon the shares
received in an involuntary acquisition. The involuntary nature of the
transaction may also affect the employee's views toward voice,
governance, and participation rights.
Employee share ownership programs also may deny employees
exit rights. Depending upon the nature of the share ownership plan,
employees may have limited access to dividends and increased share
value. For example, if a young employee owns employer stock held by
an ESOP and the ESOP precludes distributions prior to retirement or
termination of employment, then, unlike the typical public
stockholder, the employee does not have the ability to realize the
increased value of the shares or dividends that are allocated to the
ESOP account. That employee may perceive the value of the shares
to be quite low given the inaccessibility of the shares and the
dividends. In such a situation, even if an employee can see that his or
her actions-productivity improvements, governance enhancements,
and hourly wage sacrifices-lead to increased dividends and share
value, the inaccessibility to those financial gains may affect the
employee's willingness to work harder, smarter, or accept more
financial risk.
As identified by peace scholars, the broader point is that the
absence of entry and exit rights for employees who become
corporation shareholders may impact internal corporate dynamics.
On the other hand, the lack of entry or exit rights may be a critical
component of an employee share ownership program because of
regulatory requirements, corporate financing concerns, or the nature
of a privatization program. Additionally, restrictions on exit rights
may be necessary in order to ensure long-term or substantial
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employee ownership if either of those factors is an integral part of the
program.
In sum, unpacking the components of employee ownership
programs increases the transparency of the participation elements of
those programs. Formal share ownership may enable employees to
take part in corporate governance and partake financially in the
success or failure of the enterprise. But, given the existing and
ongoing nature of the typical employee-employer relationship,
employees can enjoy both governance rights and financial
participation without owning employer securities. For this reason,
the terms "ownership" and "participation" are used in this Article to
cover the full range of such programs.
Regardless of whether
ownership and participation intersect, the existence of entry and exit
rights to ownership programs may affect the corporate dynamics that
connect with sustainable peace.

III. ENABLING LEGISLATION AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
This Section considers various models of employee ownership
and participation programs as they currently exist, focusing primarily
on the United States and a number of programs from throughout the
world. The participation programs are viewed largely through the
lens of enabling legislation. This focus provides a foundation to
enable cross-border comparisons and establishes categorizations in a
way that may be more neutral than if one considers these programs
from the vantage point of a group directly affected by the programs,
such as management, labor, or founding shareholders.
Approaching the models of employee ownership
and
participation programs through the context of enabling legislation
does have some implications for this Article's analysis. This Article
neither considers in any detail the many types of informal programs
that corporations utilize to encourage employees to own corporation
stock, nor addresses informal profit sharing payments.
Those
exclusions eliminate vast numbers of situations that result in
opportunities, or mandates, for employees to own company stock.
Likewise, the exclusions ignore meaningful numbers of profit sharing
37
payments, some of which may be of significant monetary amounts.
They may also be institutionalized through unions, other types of
contractual agreements,38 and they may represent widespread

37.
See, e.g., Daniel Eisenberg, Where People Are Never Let Go; Lincoln
Electric, TIME, June 18, 2001, at 40 (citing an average bonus of $17,579 in 2000, or
about 45% of salary).
38.
See, e.g., Susan Carey, Pilots Union at Northwest Ratifies Accord, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 14, 1998, at A3 (reporting on profitsharing in the new Northwest contract with
pilots); Susan E. Peterson, Ford Profit-SharingKeeps on Truckin" STAR TRIB., Mar. 5,
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industry practice. 39
A. United States
Federal legislation in the United States encourages employee
ownership through a variety of tax-deferred and non-deferred
vehicles. 40 This Section outlines, for the non-technical reader, broad
categories of regulation and very briefly summarizes the major
vehicles for employee ownership.
1. ESOPs
ESOPs are sponsored at the firm level, 41 and certain legislation
provides significant tax incentives for those plans. 4 2 By statute,
ESOPs must exist primarily to hold employer securities, 4 3 making
them a strong example of a type of plan where employee ownership is
inherent in the plan model and the enabling legislation. In an ESOP,
each individual employee has a plan account and the account
typically is credited for each year of work with an allocation of
employer stock. 44 Stock allocations frequently are made based upon
an employee's proportional share of salary as compared to the rest of
the employee population participating in the ESOP. 45 In order for the
tax advantages to be available, the ESOP must not unduly
discriminate in favor of highly paid employees when determining
4 6
plan membership and benefit entitlements.
Companies in financial distress sometimes use ESOPs as part of
a company-restructuring program. In those situations employees
may trade-off current wages and benefits for ownership rights via the
ESOP. These kinds of arrangements are delineated by Weirton Steel,
which is discussed more extensively below, 47 and at United Airlines,

1998, at ID (reporting profit-sharing payments of $4,400 per union worker at Ford
Motor Co., $750 at General Motors, and $4,600 at Chrysler).
39.
Craig Woker, Tying Pay to Success at Minimills, NEW STEEL, Dec. 1, 1998,
at 66 (reporting on discretionary compensation, including profit sharing, in mini-mills).
40.
See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) §§ 1-4402, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994) (setting forth the basic federal regulation of pension and
welfare benefit plans).
41.

See MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS 136 (student ed. 1999).

42.
43.

Id. at 160-76.
Id. at 136.

44.

Id. at 131.

45.
See id. at 118 (discussing prevalent allocation formula for profit sharing
plans).
46.
Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing ESOPs, 45 TAx L. REV. 363, 396
(1990); Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance.BasedCompensation
Positively Affect Managerial Performance?,2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227 (1999).

47.

See infra text accompanying Part III.C.
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where more recently its pilots and mechanics agreed to an ESOP.4 8
Some companies have used ESOPs as mechanisms to discourage or
avoid hostile takeovers. 49 Other companies adopted ESOPs for a
50
variety of business reasons.
The highly regulated nature of ESOPs has significant
implications for employee exit and entrance rights. The fact that a
large percentage of lower compensated employees, or entire
bargaining units at a unionized employer, must participate in an
ESOP to receive tax advantages means that plans cannot be
structured to give significant entrance and exit rights to those
employees. Exit rights are further limited by the deferred nature of
the plans. By statute, distribution of employer stock out of the plan
typically cannot occur until the plan is terminated, or until an
individual employee retires or otherwise leaves the company.
2. Stock Purchase Plans
U.S. tax law also supports employee share ownership by
permitting employers to sponsor employee stock purchase plans.5 1 To
encourage employees to participate in stock purchase plans,
employers may discount the purchase price up to 15 percent from the
fair market value of the stock at the time of purchase.5 2 Participation
in the plan must be open to all employees with the exception of parttime employees, those employed for less than two years, and highly
paid employees.5 3 The effect is to create stock purchase plans that
are available to all "regular" employees. Like ESOPs, stock purchase
plans are targeted very specifically to support employee ownership of
employer stock.

48.
Gordon, supranote 33, at 338-53.
49.
See, e.g., Herman v. Nations Bank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir.
1997) (regarding voting issues in the Polaroid ESOP in response to a hostile tender
offer); Steven J. Arsenault, FiduciaryDuties of ESOP Trustees Under ERISA in Tender
Offers: The Impact of Herman v. Nations Bank Trust Company and a Proposal for
Reform, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 87 (2000) (discussing the issue of ESOP voting
rights in tender offers).
50.
Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction:
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1155 (1988) ("The ESOP is best
understood as a tool of corporate finance."); Brett McDonnell, ESOP's Failures:
Fiduciary Duties When Managers of Employee-Owned Companies Vote to Entrench
Themselves, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 199, 206 (2000) ("Companies use ESOP's ... as
a form of corporate finance.").
51.
William Dunn & Julie C. Rumberger, Equity-based Compensation Plansfor
Multinationals: Compensation in a Worldwide Environment, 48 TAX EXECUTIVE 373
(1996).
52.
Alden J. Bianchi, Managing the Contingent Workforce After the Microsoft
and Time Warner Cases, CORP. COUNS., Aug. 2000, at 1.
53.
Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Nondiscriminationin Employee Benefits: False Starts
and Future Trends, 52 TENN. L. REV. 167, 188 (1985).
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Stock purchase plans are permitted to provide employees with
greater exit and entrance rights than ESOPs may offer. Although all
regular employees must have the option to participate in the plan, the
law does not require plans to force employees to purchase their
company's stock. Thus, entrance rights are unrestricted by statute,
54
whereas exit rights are restricted only to a limited extent.
3. Stock Option Plans
Compared to the other plans enumerated so far, stock option
plans are subject to the least federal regulation. They are completely
exempt from Titles I and IV of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA).55 The Tax Code governs how corporations may
deduct option expenses as well as the timing and treatment of income
for the option recipient. 56 However, the Tax Code does not mandate
plan choices in these respects. Instead, the code specifies the tax
treatment of whatever programs employers establish. 57 Even federal
securities laws provide a simplified process for registering option
shares. Therefore, while the scope of the tax incentives according to
option plans vary depending upon the terms established by the plan
sponsor, the relevant laws permit employers to exercise great
flexibility in establishing these plans.
Unlike tax-favored stock purchase plans and ESOPs, tax-favored
stock option plans in the United States may be made available only to
a select group of employees. While it is not unusual for the options to
vest over a period of years, there are typically few limits on exit
rights. The relatively low level of regulation of many stock option
grants means that individual employees may have substantial entry
rights. Particularly upon hire, a top level executive may be able to
bargain for higher or lower levels of stock option compensation as
compared to other forms of compensation, depending upon the
executive's preferences.
4. Deferred Compensation Pension Plans
This category covers a variety of tax-favored plans intended to
provide deferred benefits to employees. 58
U.S. law typically

54.
Dunn & Rumberger, supra note 51 (noting that stock purchase plans are
subject to "stock holding periods").
55.
See Subcomm. on Executive Comp. of the Comm. on Employee Benefits and
Executive Comp., Executive Compensation: A 1987 Road Map for the Corporate
Advisor, 43 BUS. L. 187, 292 (1987) (noting that ERISA's vesting provisions do not
apply to stock option plans.).
56.
See generally David E. Kahen & Cheryl F. Fisher, Incentive Stock Options
Revisited, 49 TAX EXECUTIVE 487 (1997).
57.
See id.
58.
CANAN, supra note 41, at 19 (discussing qualified retirement plans).
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categorizes these plans as DC or DB plans. 59 In DC plans, the
investment risk rests upon the employees. By definition, those plans
establish individual accounts for employees.60 Depending upon the
terms of the plan, employees may choose to invest their plan assets in
employer stock, 6 1 but even if the employee makes the investment
decisions and employer stock is an available alternative, there is no
special tax incentive to encourage the purchase of employer stock
rather than any other available investment vehicle. In plans that
provide for employee-elective salary deferrals and employer-matching
contributions, frequently known as 401(k) plans, the employer may
62
require that the matching contributions be held in employer stock.
But, again, there are no regulatory provisions that encourage
investment in employer stock rather than other alternatives.
In DB plans, all of the investment risk rests upon the sponsoring
employer. 63 These plans cannot hold more than ten percent of their
assets in employer stock, 64 so there is a sense in which the
decisionmaker's entrance rights are severely limited. For purposes of
this Article, however, the effects of stock ownership do not affect the
relevant characteristics of ownership. First, the benefit plan trustee
or investment manager is responsible for voting the shares and
Second, because the
exercising any other governance rights. 65
investment risk of the plan remains upon the sponsoring employer,
any investment gains or losses accrue to that employer, and not to
Thus, employees do not have any individual or
employees. 66
collective governance rights based upon the DB plan's ownership of
employer securities.

59.
Dana Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA's Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 201, 205 (1995).
Id.
60.
By delegating investment selection to employees in compliance with specific
61.
standards, employers can avoid fiduciary liability in the choice of specific investments.
CANAN, supra note 41, at 823-31. Employers determine the investment vehicles
available to employees in those participant directed plans. Id. Many employers offer
employer stock as one of the investment options. Jack VanDerhei, Company Stock in
401(k) Plans: Results of a Survey of ISCEBS Members, at 4 (2002), at
http://www.ebri.org/pdfs/iscebs.pdf (reporting on a survey showing 48 percent of
companies reported offering company stock in their 401(k) plan).
62.
This is one of the requirements imposed by Enron that generated a great
deal of controversy. Evan Miller & Alison Cera, Learning the True Meaning of
Fiduciary,the Hard Way, NAT'L. L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at B8.
63.
Plant Closings,supra note 59, at 205-06.
64.
See CANAN, supra note 41, at 136 (listing the types of plans to which the
10% limitation does not apply).
65.
Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of Prevention: Meeting
the FiduciaryDuty to Monitor an Index Fund Through Relationship Investing, 20 IOwA
J. CORP. L. 414, 449 (1995); A.A. Sommer, Jr., Defining the Corporate Constituency:
Corporate Governance in the Nineties: Mangers vs. Institutions, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 357,
363-64 (1990).
Plant Closings, supranote 59, at 206.
66.
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5. Miscellaneous Programs
Employers in the United States utilize a wide array of other
compensation programs that may broadly fall into the rubric of
employee participation plans.6 7 This Article describes above quality
circles and like programs that encourage employee involvement in
workplace decision-making.
From the financial participation
perspective, corporations use numerous mechanisms, which range
from the substantial lump sum profit sharing payments made by
some automotive manufacturers in the late 1990s, 68 to the pink
Cadillacs awarded to top sales people of the Mary Kay cosmetic
company.6 9 These types of programs do not tend to be governed by
specialized provisions of U.S. benefits or securities law and do not
receive any special tax deferrals or other incentives. Due to the
paucity of legislation and the difficulty in identifying and cataloguing
these programs, they receive little coverage in this Article.
B. Sampling non-U.S. Legislation
Legislation that enables employee ownership and participation is
widely divergent and reasonably prevalent across the world. Experts
cite Jamaica as having one of the world's most progressive ESOP
frameworks.7 0 Through what is widely known as the European
Works Council Directive, the European Union requires many
companies, particularly multinationals, to establish either a
procedure or a European Works Council to engage in consultation
with and provide information to employees. 7 1 In Poland, employee

67.
For discussions of employee participation plans and their relationship with
unionized representation, see Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New
Millennium: Redefining a Labor Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1651 (1999); Bruce E. Kaufman, The Employee Participation/RepresentationGap:
An Assessment and Proposed Solution, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 491 (2001); David W.
Orlandini, Comment, Employee ParticipationPrograms: How to Make them Work Today
and in the Twenty-First Century, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 597 (1995).
68.
Peterson, supra note 38 (reporting profit-sharing payments of $4,400 per
union worker at Ford Motor Co., $750 at General Motors, and $4,600 at Chrysler).
69.
Ieva M. Augstums, Mary Kay Convention Opens, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
July 18, 2002 (reporting Mary Kay's incentives include pink Cadillacs as well as other
vehicles). But see Sabrina Tavernise, Red Square's Pinkish Tinge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 2002, at C6 (reporting Mary Kay is not offering pink Cadillacs as incentives in
Moscow).
70.
Ryan Weeden & Corey Rosen, Nat'l Ctr. for Employee Ownership,
Employee Ownership in a Global Context, at 3, 7 (2002), at http://www.nceoglobal.org
articles/aroundtheworld.html [hereinafter NCEO Report].
71.
Janice R. Bellace, The European Works Council Directive: Transnational
Information and Consultation in the European Union, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 325, 350

(1997).
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ownership has been used in the process of privatizing formerly state72
owned enterprises.
This sampling barely indicates the variation in the methods and
scale of employee ownership and participation programs worldwide.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to even begin to survey the array
of legislation across the globe. This Article concentrates briefly on
France, Egypt, and Russia. France was selected as a Western
European contrast to the United States.
Russia presents an
interesting case not only because it utilized employee ownership in its
privatization process, but also because of its political and economic
history. Finally, Egypt is a counterpoint to Russia in that Egypt also
established employee ownership legislation as part of its privatization
program, and it is culturally distinct from the other countries
discussed.
1. France
In the mid-1980s France consolidated legislation enabling and
providing tax advantages to company programs for employee share
ownership, compulsory deferred profit-sharing plans, and voluntary
cash profit sharing arrangements. 73 The legislation also encouraged
employee representation on company boards when employees own at
least five percent of the company's equity shares. 74 Approximately
2,000, or less than ten percent of the total firms with some type of
financial participation program, sponsored savings or employee
ownership plans that invest exclusively or primarily in company
stock. 75 In comparison, in 1997 approximately 15,500 deferred profit
sharing agreements covered some 4.8 million employees and provided
76
about 3.8 percent of those employees' wages.
Employee share ownership plans in France are similar to the
401(k) plans prevalent in the United States because they may permit
voluntary contributions by employees with employer matching
contributions. The plans are also similar to U.S. stock purchase
plans because, to encourage employee participation, employers may
discount the purchase price of company stock. 77 The voluntary
nature of these plans provides some entry rights albeit with financial
incentives attributable to any employer match and discounted stock
purchase price.
Privatization in the mid-1980s and again in the early 1990s
utilized share ownership plans. In the 1980s, however, employee

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

NCEO Report, supra note 70, at 68.
Vaughan-Whitehead, supra note 31, at 59-60.
Id. at 61-62.
NCEO Report, supra note 70, at 34-38.
Id.
Vaughan-Whitehead, supra note 31, at 58.
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purchases at most companies did not reach the ten percent of stock
set aside for the employee population. Employees showed more
enthusiasm in the 1990s, but there have been criticisms that
ownership did not sufficiently increase employees' decision-making
78
participation.
In addition to employee contributions and privatization, share
ownership plans also may be funded through either deferred or cash
profit sharing payments. Yet, in order to access the tax advantages,
the amounts contributed to a share ownership plan must be
inaccessible for at least five years.7 9 This restriction means that the
plans significantly limit employee exit.
A significant difference between France and the United States is
that French law requires all companies with at least 50 employees to
sponsor a deferred profit sharing plan.8 0 Each plan must include all
employees with at least six months of service. 81 The law contains tax
incentives to encourage companies to provide more than the statutory
minimum profit sharing formula.8 2 On the other hand, statutory
maximums limit the amount of the profit-sharing payments that can
be made to the most highly paid employees. The compulsory nature
of these plans means that workers have no flexibility on entry rights,
other than perhaps to bargain for more than the minimum payment.
The legislation blocks employee access to the funds for between three
83
and five years, thus limiting exit rights.
2. Egypt
Egypt's development of legislation that permits employee
ownership dates only to 1992. Egypt allowed employee access to
share purchases, a mandated feature of privatization, by requiring at
least ten percent of shares to be made available to employees.8 4 The
trust-like entities established to purchase and hold employer stock in
these programs are Employer Stockholder Associations (ESAs). In
addition to the mandatory set-aside, the legislation permits
companies to adopt the equivalent of a U.S.-style ESOP to add higher
85
levels of employee ownership.
Majority ownership tends to result at companies that are too
weak to attract external buyers.8 6 As a consequence of financing

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 68.
NCEO Report, supra note 70, at 37-38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 30.
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difficulties, which are discussed below,87 there appear to be few active
ESAs in Egypt. Only 86 existed in late 1996, approximately one-third
88
of which owned the majority of the company's stock.
Apparently, membership in an ESA8 9 is open to all employees at
the company. Employee participation might be optional depending
upon the approach used to finance share purchases. The ESA's share
purchases may be funded through a loan arrangement, company
funding, or employee contributions. 90
Because newly privatized
companies typically are unable to fund these share purchases and
ESAs have had difficulty in obtaining outside loans, employee funds
frequently are used.
This typically entails the use of existing
employee pension funds or ongoing employee contributions.
Investment of employee pension funds in a company too weak to
attract external investment or an ESA loan increases the employees'
financial risk. If the company fails, the employees are left with
worthless shares, no jobs, and a defunct pension fund.9 1 On the other
hand, purchases funded through ongoing employee contributions may
not attract substantial amounts of employee investment. The extent
of entry rights in these programs obviously varies and depends on the
type of financing used by the ESA.
An individual's participation in an ESA ends at the termination
of employment. 92 There is also an indication that employees may
voluntarily withdrawal their plan assets at an earlier date. 93 The
scope of exit rights depends upon the nature of any legal or practical
restrictions on early withdrawal.
Employees receive governance rights in an ESA, but no direct
governance rights in the company. 94 Employees who participate in
the ESA form a general assembly that elects the ESA's Board of
Directors. 95 The Board manages the ESA and votes the ESA's shares
in matters that go to the company's shareholders for vote. The ESA
cannot sell shares to anyone who is not an employee or former
96
employee without the approval of the majority of ESA participants.
This would seem to be a potential deterrent to a hostile acquisition
and, thus, may serve to entrench management.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See infra text accompanying note 86.
NCEO Report, supranote 70, at 30.
Too little information on ESOPs in Egypt is available to bear discussion.
Id.
NCEO Report, supra note 70, at 27-28.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26-29.
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3. Russia
Between 1992 and 199497 Russia's privatization program
98
resulted in high levels of employee ownership at privatized firms.
Legislation provided employees with the choice of three alternative
mechanisms for privatization, involving different levels of employee
ownership and variations in the use of cash or vouchers to purchase
enterprise shares. 99 Most employee groups chose the second option,
which permitted workers to purchase 51 percent of the enterprise. 0 0
Workers obtained majority ownership in approximately two-thirds of
the privatized firms during this period. That included a substantial
number of shares held by top managers, estimated at 8.6 percent. 10'
The availability of alternative privatization schemes permitted some
collective entry decision-making rights.
Privatization and employee ownership in Russia presented some
unique challenges. While familiar with collective ownership, the
Russian population may have been the only population of the Central
and European countries that had no first-hand experience with a
market-based economy. 10 2 One commentator noted that Russians did
not have in the past an individualistic and entrepreneurial business
culture found in the West. 10 3 Furthermore, managers reportedly
encouraged employees to transfer their proxy rights to management.
Even when these transfers were not made, employees faced potential
04
voting pressure because voting was not confidential.1
Finally, the level of corruption in Russia may cause Russia to be
a particularly interesting example when observing the relationship
between employee ownership and participation, and sustainable
peace. Fort and Schipani observed that high levels of corruption may
lead to conflict, which makes corruption a negative factor for
sustainable peace. 10 5 Commentators observed low levels of honesty
in the Russian economy during the 19th century, the post-

97.
The Author concontrates on this time period because it covers the initial
wave of Russian privitizaitons and resulted in significant employee ownership.
98.
Bogdan Lissovolik, Rapid Spread of Employee Ownership in the Privatized
Russia, in PRIVATIZATION SURPRISES IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 204, 219 (Milica Uvalic

& Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead eds., 1997).
99.

JOSEPH R. BLASI ET AL., KREMLIN CAPITALISM: PRIVATIZING THE RUSSIAN

ECONOMY 41 (1997); Lissovolik, supra note 98, at 217; NCEO Report, supra note 70, at
70-71.

100.
Lissovolik, supra note 98, at 217; NCEO Report, supra note 70, at 70-71.
101.
Lissovolik, supra note 98, at 220. See also BLASI ET AL., supra note 99, at
193 tbl. 4 (estimating holdings by top managers as 8% and 10% in 1995 and 1996
respectively).
102.
Lissovolik, supra note 98, at 206.
103.
Id. at 208.
104.

BLASI ET AL., supra note 99, at 106-07.

105.

Fort & Schipani, supra note 15, at 394-99.
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revolutionary period, and in the recent post-privatization period. 10 6
Over the long term, it may be productive to determine whether
employee ownership affects a firm's willingness to engage in corrupt
practices. If so, Fort and Schipani's observations implied a resulting
effect on the level of violence.
Legislative frameworks supporting employee ownership and
participation are not rare in countries around the world. This brief
survey barely touched upon the existence and scope of the legislative
approaches.
Clearly, both Western, industrialized countries and
emerging economies often use some form of employee ownership or
participation.
Even small
countries
with very
limited
1 08
industrialization, such as Jamaica 10 7 and Trinidad and Tobago,
have
enacted legislation enabling employee
ownership or
participation.
C. Weirton Steel-One Company's Experience
Consider a company with a long history of paternalism, both
internally and in its community. Company workers received wages in
excess of the typical industry wages. 10 9
The company and
government joined forces to provide social services, such as a hospital,
community center, 110 and public library.'1 ' The existence of basic
infrastructure support such as gas, water, and electricity was
inextricably linked with the company. 11 2 Eventually, the political,
cultural, and economic frameworks shifted.
Product markets
changed. 113 Plants and equipment became obsolete because of the
lack of investment or poor construction and maintenance. 1 4 The
paternalistic system of employment, social services, and government
foundered in the face of economic pressures. External cultural and
business frameworks rendered the old ways obsolete. 115 Ownership
116
of the enterprise was soon transferred to the employees.
Numerous companies in countries throughout the world have
117
turned to employee ownership in times of economic transition.

106.
Lissovolik, supra note 98, at 208; see also BLASI ET AL., supra note 99, at
114-21 (discussing the influence of the "Russian Mafia").
107.
NCEO Report, supra note 70, at 58-67.
108.
Id. at 78-79.
109.
VARANO, supra note 10, at 67, 71.
110.
Id. at 67.
111.
Id. at 72.
112.
Id. at 69.
113.
Id. at 83.
114.
Id. at 84.
115.
Id. at 73-77.
116.
Id. at 139.
117.
See Milica Uvalic & Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, Introduction: Creating
Employee Capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe, in PRIVITIZATION SURPRISES IN
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This phenomenon occurred during the 1990s in Russia and in some of
the Central and Eastern European countries.11 8 Employee ownership
occurred somewhat in France in the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s."l 9
It occurred to a limited extent in Egypt in the 1990s. As a matter of
fact, the foregoing example describes the events at Weirton Steel
Company in 1984 preceding the formation of one of the best-known
ESOPs in the United States.
The saga of employee ownership at Weirton Steel began as one of
"forced ownership"; 120 the operations would be restructured and
12 1
refinanced under employee ownership or they would be closed.
One worker explained that employees had only the choice to either
"buy it or lose it.' 22 While technically the workers had the right to
reject the ESOP, they had little bargaining power. Thus, the 89
percent employee vote in favor of the restructuring package,
including the ESOP, 12 3 did not evidence strong worker sentiment in
favor of entry into employee ownership. Rather, it reflected the
desire of a shocked and desperate community to preserve its
livelihood.
As posited earlier, 124 if entry and exit rights are
imperative for employee voice, then the Weirton employees had no
real choice with respect to entry; once the ESOP was established, the
25
ESOP significantly limited exit rights. 1
The terms of the Weirton Steel ESOP drastically limited
employee participation in significant corporate decision-making.
Employees were precluded from participating in the selection of board
members for the first five years of the ESOP's existence. Even after
five years, the ESOP terms required the majority of the Board to be
Thus, in terms of the
comprised of independent directors.1 26
components of employee ownership discussed earlier as being likely

TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES, supra note 98, at 10-12 (listing employee ownership
legislation in Central and Eastern European countries).
See id. at 1-44 (providing an overview of employee ownership in Central
118.
and Eastern Europe).
Andrei A. Baev, Is There a Niche for the State in Corporate Governance?
119.
Securitization of State-Owned Enterprisesand New Forms of State Ownership, 18 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 1, 9 n.22 (1995); James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate
Governance and United States InstitutionalInvestors, 21 BROOK J. INTL L. 1, 56 (1995); see
also Michael S. Simons, Global Airline Alliances-Reaching Out to New Galaxies in a
Changing Competitive Market-the Star Aliance & OneWorld, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 313, 321
(2000) (noting that after the partial privatization of Air France, employees would own 3% of
the company).
120.
VARANO, supra note 10, at 81.
Id. at 79-81.
121.
Id. at 81.
122.
123.
Id. at 133.
124.
See supra Part II.B.3.
125.
VARANO, supra note 10, at 137.
126.
Id. at 138-39.

2003]

GROUNDINGS OF VOICE IN EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

to affect employee voice, the Weirton ESOP ranked very low in the
level of governance rights enjoyed by employee owners.
The employees gained voting rights five years after instituting
the ESOP. At that time, Weirton Steel was profitable and making
profit-sharing payments. 127 Yet, the company needed to make a
substantial investment in equipment and capital improvements. The
employee-owners had not been willing to forgo profit sharing
payments in order to fund those improvements.
When first
confronted with a proposal to undertake a public stock offering, which
would have diluted their ownership, employees reacted vociferously
against the proposal. 128 Thus, the Board withdrew that proposal two
days prior to the scheduled shareholder vote. 12 9 The employees
ultimately approved a restructuring plan under which they retained
majority ownership and the right for the ESOP to select a director to
130
represent its interests.
With regard to the third component of employee ownership, the
initial restructuring of Weirton Steel in 1984 did include substantial
employee participation programs, including the establishment of
voluntary Employee Participation Groups (EPGs) that technically
were unrelated to the ESOP. 13 1 The company provided EPGs with
initial training on the concept and implementation of participation,
paid overtime rates for meeting times, and assigned professional
facilitators to assist the EPGs. 132 After three years, though, even
liberal estimates indicated that only about 14 percent of the
employees participated in EPGs. 133 In his extensive, on-site research
at Weirton Steel, Professor Varano documented significant levels of
management hostility toward EPGs and rejections of EPG proposals
without any logical basis. 134 He also observed problems with EPGs
that desired to address issues in areas that were reserved to
management decision-making or to union bargaining. 135
Varano
stated, "For workers EPG led to frustration and criticism expressed in
moral terms and that drew from a normative order that was regularly
evoked alongside their moderate expectations of the participation
reforms."'136 He believed that EPG institutionalized class divisions
and structure at Weirton Steel. 137 By failing to change the real
allocation of power between management and employees, EPG failed

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
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137.
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to create any "identity of interests. ' 138 By late September 1996, no
139
more than 65 employees remained active in EPGs.
On the other hand, Weirton Steel calculated that EPGs saved it
"an equivalency of $330 million in sales" in 1986.140 Though it may
have been a small percentage of the total workforce, approximately
1,200 employees did participate in EPGs in 1986.141 By 1988, at least
142
2,000 employees had participated in EPG training as well.
Perhaps, at least during the early years of the ESOP, EPGs provided
some mechanism for employees to explore their rights to voice their
considerations about their company.
Varano's study of the Weirton community surfaced controversies
and confusion within the community that he believed were associated
with employee ownership. In Varano's words, "events and company
policies undermined local customs and normative codes that people
relied on in constructing a meaningful and morally relevant view of
worker ownership.' 1 43 Once the mill became employee owned, the
144
community blamed mill workers for being overpaid and inefficient.
The community and workers alike struggled with management's
compensation levels. 145 Varano concluded that, "Four years after
ESOP both the basis of leadership as well as its monetary value were
being seriously questioned as class divisions became more
transparent. '146 The struggles faced by owners-as employees and as
a community-along with a financially unsound business debilitated
the complex web of community reliance that had developed during
lucrative and paternalistic times.
Employee ownership cannot bear sole responsibility for Weirton
Steel's struggles. The entire U.S. steel industry had been under
intense pressure from international competition, changing demand,
and aging industrial facilities. 147 Varano's lens on the conflicts that
developed among workers, management, and the Weirton community,
focuses on the role of employee ownership during one situation of
economic and cultural transition. As such, Varano's concerns may be
relevant in evaluating whether employee ownership and participation
can enhance employee voice and the subsequent question of whether

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 153.

147.

Nelson D. Schwartz, Bent But Unbowed: The Giants of American Steel are

Id.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245-49.
Id. at 253-64.
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on the Verge of Extinction, FORTUNE, July, 22, 2002, at 118, 120 ("[Tlhere's nothing
pretty about the U.S. steel industry these days.").
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employee voice can make a positive contribution to corporate
governance, business ethics, and peace.

IV. CONCEPTUAL CONNECTIONS-EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AND
PARTICIPATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, BUSINESS ETHICS, AND
SUSTAINABLE PEACE

In this Section, an initial conceptual inquiry is made into the
possible connections among employee ownership and participation
programs, corporate governance, business ethics, and sustainable
peace. It begins by considering whether employee ownership and
participation might be useful in monitoring corporate management
and encouraging practices that support sustainable peace. Then, a
more general variant of that question is considered: Might employee
ownership and participation affect the extent to which corporations
model democratic principles?
Finally, this Section concludes by
exploring whether employee ownership and participation could lead
to reductions in what some commentators identify as "sources of
48
conflict."1
A. Monitoring ManagerialChoices
Some participants in the 2001 Peace Symposium considered
ways in which managerial choices might affect the environment for
sustainable peace.
Professor Jeffery Nesteruk argued that a
conception of the firm as property, with all implicit loyalties being
directed to the equity shareholders, may lead to a "diminished form of
community.' 149 His analysis implied that a communitarian notion of
the corporation might be more compatible with the underlying factors
thought to support peaceful societies. 150
Professor Lee A. Tavis
contended that, in spite of some economic arguments to the contrary,
151
managers had room to exercise discretion in their decision-making.
He also observed that, in some contexts, corporations were displacing
governments as the relevant actors in situations where governments
had historically taken the lead. 152 Without presuming to answer it in
this initial inquiry, this Section inquires whether employee
ownership and participation might enhance monitoring of managerial
decision-making in ways that, at least indirectly, promote
peacefulness or discourage conflict.
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1. Firm Level Challenges
Employee ownership and participation might have implications
for employee voice on four firm level challenges identified as being
relevant to peace dynamics. The first challenge is the need to
monitor management for activities of self-interest in modern
corporations, which so frequently bifurcate ownership and control.
Second, if one accepts the nexus-of-contracts model of the corporation,
is it possible that employee ownership might mitigate the otherwise
uni-dimensional profit focus? Third, assuming a stakeholder model of
the corporation, might employee ownership and participation ensure
that at least some non-shareholder constituencies receive reasonable
consideration? Finally, to the extent corporations are assuming some
roles previously played by governments, do employees have a special
competence and interest in monitoring managerial decision-making?
Respected commentators from Adolfe A. Berle and Gardiner C.
Means 15 3 in the 1930s to Eric Orts 154 in recent years have observed
the challenges posed by the bifurcation of ownership and
management in modern corporations. Management's self-interest
conflicts with shareholder interests, or potentially with other
stakeholder interests, in basic areas as the amount of management
compensation, job retention, and work effort.
Orts effectively
captures these conflicts with the evocative phrase "shirking and
sharking. ''15 5
The concerns of management self-interest exist
whether one views the firm as a nexus of contracts or believes it owes
obligations to a broader array of stakeholders. The key difference is
whether management's interests conflict only with shareholders or
with an array of stakeholders.
According to commentators such as Nesteruk, the nexus-ofcontracts model of corporations poses a particular risk for
peacefulness because it requires management to work solely toward
profit-enhancement. Arguably, this laser-like focus on profits may
lead to decisions that increase shareholder returns while impinging
upon basic human rights, 156 derogating the environment, 157 or
engaging in bribery to acquire contracts or otherwise facilitate the
corporation's business. 158 The result may be to increase resentment
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toward multinational corporations; lock people into unhealthy
environments incapable of providing the clean air, potable water, and
food necessary for life; or contribute to corruption at local levels.
Even the stakeholder theory of corporations brings with it
difficulties and risks for sustainable peace. Modern corporations
interface with and affect countless categories of people,
other
institutions, and local communities. The diversity of a multinational
corporation's constituencies almost ensures that taking the needs,
desires, and views of those constituencies into account in corporate
decision-making will not be a simple process.
A number of
commentators have discussed the difficulties inherent in this process,
including the potential for direct conflicts in the interests of various
159
constituent groups.
Peace commentators have observed that multinationals
increasingly stand in roles formerly held by governments. 160 Tavis
reported as an example that 12 multinational entities were successful
in developing intellectual property regulation. 161 As managers of
multinationals take on roles similar to those held by public officials, it
becomes logical to inquire whether the existing checks on managerial
authority remain sufficient. Tavis observed that the marketplace was
one constraint on the actions of multinational corporations in these
situations. 162 It seems fair to question whether the democratic
principles of transparency, representation, and accountability to
those governed may also have increasing relevance in the monitoring
of corporations, especially as multinationals exercise new types of
power.
2. Employees as Effective Monitors
Employee ownership and participation programs can help meet
the need for monitoring of corporate management. Employees may be
particularly effective in monitoring managerial self-interest in both
the shirking and the sharking senses. 16 3 At least when viewed
collectively, one would expect the employee population to be familiar
with the company's business and its competitors, as well as the dayto-day roles, activities, and commitments evidenced by management.
As Gordon stated, "Employees are often in a good position-much

& BuS. 269, 280 (1998) (advocating a uniform world-wide standard against corporate
bribery).
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better than public shareholders-to evaluate the exercise of
managerial authority within the firm ...[and may be] especially well
suited for assignments such as the compensation committee. . . ",164
Day-to-day presence and knowledge of the firm may enable
employees to identify more overt corruption and unethical activity
even though organizational complexity and individual specialization
may make this task increasingly difficult. 16 5 Dworkin observed that
"corruption and unethical practices in the workplace are ... thought
to result in declining confidence in major institutions and to
contribute to the alienation and anomie experienced in modern
society."'1 66 Similarly, Fort and Schipani identified a potential link
between corruption and violence. 167
Ownership interests may
increase financial or moral incentives for employees to root out and
report corporate wrongdoing before it drains the corporation's
business assets, or before it causes negative reputational effects that
will affect the stock price. The works of Dworkin, Fort, and Schipani
imply that this may be a small but valuable contribution.
Gordon does not explain why he singled out the compensation
committee as an especially appropriate forum for employee
involvement.
Perhaps he believed that employees are uniquely
situated to measure the long- and short-term contributions of
managers.
In addition to their presence in the workplace and
familiarity with the corporation, employees tend to have long-term
interests in their employer. Their jobs, their pension, any other
deferred compensation, as well as their own professional reputations,
68
may be tied to the long-term success of the firm.
Employees may be effective monitors of management even in the
absence of the types of ownership and participation considered in this
Article. A strong union might obtain the necessary information,
provide employees with voice and protection, and gather sufficient
collective power to enable their monitoring. Perhaps, in the Western
European system, the concepts of information and consultation' 6 9
may enable monitoring.
The question is not whether employee ownership and
participation is the sole route to employee monitoring. Instead, it is
whether employee ownership and participation can contribute to
successful monitoring. Arguably at least, by increasing employees'
financial stake in the corporate enterprise, these programs may
further focus employee attention on monitoring opportunities. As
financial participants, whether through ownership or profit sharing
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programs, employees may have a greater interest in preventing
shirking and sharking than that established by their role as
employees. Furthermore, a significant ownership stake or extensive
participation program may give employees voice and power to ensure
that management does not ignore employee views. Achieving this
effect may require both the type of significant ownership levels that
typically only occur through ESOPs or vouchers and limitations on
entry and exit rights.
If corporations are viewed as a nexus-of-contracts operation, then
employee ownership 170 might significantly change the company's
decision-making dynamics. Even in maximizing shareholder value,
Tavis argued that managers have significant discretion in making
decisions that affect the corporation and its role in the communities
where it operates. 171 For example, how do managers establish the
balance between long-term and short-term value? If two alternative
projects have the same net present value, how do managers choose
As shareholders, employees can exercise their
between them?
traditional shareholder powers to convey their views on those
issues. 172 Their perspective as employees may enrich the analysis
that shareholders typically bring to these issues. For instance, their
other long-term connections with the corporation 173 may lead
employee shareholders to emphasize the long-term vision of the
of
corporation. Also, their experiences as employees and as members 174
the communities where the corporation maintains operations
might lead employees to scrutinize management actions through a
unique lens: a larger, socially conscious view that might not be held
by a typical institutional shareholder.
Turning to the constituency model of the corporation, employee
ownership and participation may have a role in resolving conflicts
among constituencies. Factors enabling employees to evaluate and
balance competing pressures might be the richness of their
perspective, as long-term employee stakeholders, citizens of the firm's
communities, and as actors who are familiar with the firm's
operations and challenges. Even the more implicit factors, such as
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Numerous examples exist of shareholder proposals that garner
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How to Fix Corporate Governance, BUS. WEEK, May 6, 2002, at 69, 74.
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See supra text accompanying note 168 (discussing employee long-term
interests).
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See VARANO, supra note 10, at 104 (quoting Harvey Sperry, Wilkie, Farr &
Gallagher from the transcript of The Great Weirton Stee(a)l, First Run Features, 1984,
at 105) ("You can't confuse ownership and being an employee. At home, a shareholder.
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the nexuses discussed by Tavis and Dom~nec Mel6, 175 that bind the
constituencies may find their way into management decision-making
through the exercise of voice by employee stakeholders.
The constituency models call for corporations to take the
employee group into account in decision-making as one of the
corporation's significant constituencies. 176 Arguably, then, employee
ownership is not necessary in order to ensure that management
includes employee voice as a decision-making factor. Nonetheless,
ownership and financial participation increases employees' stake in
the firm.
That increased stake may encourage the employee
constituency to develop and voice its perspective. For example, the
extensive use of profit-sharing programs in France may encourage
employee voice because higher profit levels should translate into
higher levels of total compensation for employees. Thus, employee
ownership and participation programs may have some role in
addressing Tavis' concern that weak stakeholders need protection
from strong ones.1 77
The most obvious implication is that if
employees would constitute a weak cohort without ownership, then
ownership may increase the cohort's relative power. More subtly
stated, if employees also represent the interests of their communities,
then empowering the employee cohort through ownership or
participation may also indirectly enhance other stakeholder interests.
Finally, employees may serve as important monitors as
corporations take over roles formerly assumed by governments. Fort
and Schipani observed a link between democratic principles and
peaceful societies. 178 The potential benefits of employee ownership
and participation parallel the advantages in the context of the nexusof-contract and constituency models of corporations.
Employee
ownership and participation may serve as a check in a checks-andbalances system to protect against misuse of corporate power. Hence,
it may be an incentive for employees to take interest in corporate
decision-making, and it may enrich their perspectives. Lastly, it may
help ensure that corporate decisionmakers do not disregard employee
voice.
1 79
3. "Workers by Day"'

Employee ownership and participation may bring with it its own
set of challenges for a corporation. Varano observed that these
programs might lead to structural conflicts of interest. 8 0
This
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concern is partially evinced through the following view: "You can't
confuse ownership and being an employee. At home, a shareholder.
At work an employee."'' 1 An inherent tension exists when expecting
employees to monitor firm management while simultaneously
expecting that management is supervising the employees. Yet asking
employees to leave their ownership interest at home both forfeits
some of the advantages of employee ownership and imposes a sort of
schizophrenic existence upon employees.
Even commentators such as Gordon-who is quoted above on the
unique role employees may have in monitoring management,
particularly with regard to compensation issues 1 82-are not entirely
consistent in their support of employee monitoring. In the same
article where he suggested that employees may serve as efficient
monitors of executive compensation, Gordon discussed the United
Airlines, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan (UAL ESOP). l8 3 He
noted with seeming favor that, "The sensitive matter of compensation
of senior management [at UAL] is addressed by a complicated
committee structure.' ' 8 4 The implicit concern seemed to be that
employees might be unable to rationally address the need to pay
market rates of executive compensation and structure appropriate
incentives for top management.
Varano raised similar questions about employee attitudes
toward other strategic and financial decisions as a result of his study
of Weirton Steel. He noted that employees might have a preference
for current profit sharing over long term investment. 8 5 Employees
might fight public stock sales that dilute their ownership interest and
rights 8 6 even if the sales are the best avenue for financial
restructuring, funding capital projects, or other important corporate
purposes.
By aligning employees' financial incentives with those of equity
shareholders, there is also a danger that ownership and financial
participation programs could actually increase problematic corporate
behavior. Ownership and financial participation programs, such as
the profit sharing programs common in France, may motivate
employees to support management in seeking higher levels of profit
without regard to the social, environmental, or conflict ramifications.
Employees themselves might also take actions to enhance profits but
that impinge on communities in negative ways. If so, then the
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ownership and financial participation programs may negate, or even
reverse, the positive role that advocates of a stakeholder approach to
corporate theory expect employees to serve.
In sum, commentators at the 2001 Peace Symposium identified
ways in which traditional corporate law theories of management selfinterest, theories of the firm, and the changing role of multinational
corporations may contribute to peaceful societies.
Employee
ownership and control might play a role in addressing the concerns
addressed at the symposium, or they might simply serve as a
moderating influence.
At least in some situations, employee
ownership and participation programs may increase employees'
incentives to actively monitor management and enrich their
perspectives. They may help ensure that management does not
disregard employee voice. Yet, there remains the possibility that
employee ownership and participation will pose structural conflicts
within the corporation when one's role as an employee intersects with
one's role as an owner.
B. Modeling DemocraticPrinciples
At the 2001 Peace Symposium, Fort and Schipani observed that
a society's level of peacefulness might be positively correlated with
the use of democratic governing principles.' 8 7
Taking this
observation a step further, multinational corporations can choose to
act in ways that model democracy for their employees and the
broader communities in which they are active.' 8 8 As Tavis stated,
"Through an ethos of participation and empowerment, multinationals
can also contribute to democratization."' 8 9 It is useful, then, to
consider whether employee ownership and participation programs
may contribute to the development of democratic principles within a
corporation.
1. Effect of Employee Ownership and Participation
Multinational corporations may utilize employee ownership and
participation programs as one tool among many to bring democratic
ideals to the workplace. This Section discusses three ways in which
these programs may reinforce ideals of self-governance and support
employee voice. Commentators have identified each of these ideals as
being important to the connection between democratic principles and
peacefulness.
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First, employee ownership and participation programs may be
methods by which multinationals can enable employees to use basic
voting rights. Formal ownership may provide employees a role in the
election of directors, or the right to vote in certain corporate
Therefore, ownership and participation programs
transactions.
establish opportunities for employees to utilize voting skills that are
important for members of a functioning democracy. Although the
power of a single or small number of votes or voice may be negligible,
it too mirrors the nature of democratic governments.
Second, implicit factors of employee ownership and participation
programs may have an effect on employees and their attitudes toward
Tavis observed that democracies could be
conflict resolution.
characterized in a narrow sense as those governmental units that hold
free elections. 190 A slightly different definition, however, looks to
"[d]ifferent conceptual, less measurable components"'191 though such
The
definitions also "engender[] substantial disagreement."'1 92
definition of democracy might include elements such as political
participation, mechanisms to enhance voice, and increased decisionmaking transparency. 1 93 Dworkin also appeared to support a nuanced
view of democracy. She observed that a whistle-blowing program
"gives individuals a say in their organization, and contributes to a
feeling of procedural justice."'1 94 In addition, they "[give] individuals a
standardized way to speak and be heard [which] also helps reinforce
Thus, it is possible to identify various
democratic ideas."'195
components of democratic institutions by taking a broad view.
Employee ownership and participation programs may enable
employees to experience and develop skills with these components of
democracy. For example, the programs have some parallels with
whistle-blowing programs as tools of good governance. As discussed
earlier, 196 employee ownership and participation programs can enable
and encourage employee voice. By encouraging employee monitoring,
they can increase management accountability. 1 97 Ownership and
participation programs can also provide procedural mechanisms
through which employees can provide input.
Third, programs that enable employees as owners and
participants in the governance of their employer may further equality
Tavis believed that economic inequality challenges
norms.
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democracy. 198 In Varano's study of the Weirton Steel ESOP, he
observed that rank and file employees share "class interests and
community norms." 199 He argued that these shared interests lead
workers to pursue equality in pay systems such as profit sharing as
well as collective interests such as job security. 20 0
Even an
employer's choice of an ownership program can model equality
principles. For example, employee stock purchase plans typically are
open to a wider array of workers than are stock option plans. But,
because participation depends on an employee's willingness to
participate and ability to afford the purchase of stock, equality of
access may be quite superficial. An ESOP or voucher program, in
contrast, may result in a much higher percentage of employees
holding ownership interests.
2. Possible Irrelevance of Employee Voice
One question that requires further thought in this context is the
extent to which workplace governance parallels societal governance.
If significant differences exist, then corporations may face challenges
in modeling democratic principles for external communities. In this
regard, Logue argued that "Economic democracy differs significantly
from political democracy. It is shaped by the unforgiving nature of
'20 1
the market economy."
More specifically, Logue listed five ways in which democracy
within corporations differs from political democracy. First, not all
votes and opinions are equal in a corporation. 20 2 This recognizes
somewhat the limited use of democracy by some corporations rather
than being an inherent difference between corporations and political
entities. Further, one might ask whether all opinions are truly equal
in political democracy, or whether some people are more persuasive
because of their wealth, family connections, education, or more
undefined characteristics such as charisma. Second, Logue argued
that consensus is necessary in a corporation. 203
Some level of
consensus, however, is necessary for a functioning democracy, and
corporations do tolerate some level of challenge.
In fact, some
commentators now argue that encouraging dissent within a
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corporation is important to ensuring good governance, 20 4 and it seems
20 5
that several corporations operate this way.
Third, Logue observed that it is easy to vote with one's feet in a
corporation. 20 6 This often is not true for rank-and-file workers who
may be locked into their current employment situation or at least
their geographic area due to family, educational, property, or cultural
factors. Fourth, Logue asserted that the competitive market defines
a corporation's purpose whereas governmental democracies have
more flexibility in defining their goals. 2 0 7 Certainly Logue was
correct that corporations must remain economically viable to survive.
However, the same is true of governmental entities. Tavis argued
convincingly that even within economic constraints, corporate
managers have some flexibility in decision-making. 20 8 Finally, Logue
believed that members of companies are better informed than citizens
of democracies although he cited no data to support this assertion.
One would think that information levels would depend on many
factors such as transparency, education, and incentives to become
informed.
Though Logue was not entirely convincing in the specific
arguments he made, it is certainly possible to think that corporate
democracy may differ inherently from political democracy. Perhaps
corporations might purport to utilize ownership and participation
programs in ways that promote worker democratic involvement,
where in reality they sponsor programs that permit workers to
exercise voice in only limited or illusory ways. In such instances,
corporations may poison workers' views of democracy.
Varano
observed that worker ownership may "ignore[ ] workers as producers
and minimize[ ] or exclude[ ] any inclinations they have toward
control.
Indirectly, it seeks to manage such inclinations by
structuring another financial stake for workers beyond their wages in
exchange for obedience and discipline. '20 9 In fact, it appears that
workers at Weirton Steel became frustrated with their lack of voting
rights, 210 inability to influence compensation decisions, 211 and
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management's failure to act in response to recommendations of the
212
participation program groups.
One view of the positive role employee ownership and
participation might play is in strengthening implicit democratic
norms of voice, dispute resolution, and procedural justice. 213 In
practice, however, the extent to which employee ownership can
effectively change a corporation's internal culture remains unclear.
One current example helps to illustrate the difficulties even majority
ownership programs, such as an ESOP, face when confronted with an
entrenched culture of internal animosity. In 1994, an ESOP took
control of more than 50 percent of UAL. 2 14 At a time of significant
economic pressure, pilots and mechanics agreed to an estimated $4.9
billion in wage reductions and work rule changes in exchange for the
UAL arbitrarily included non-union
ESOP arrangements. 215
the flight attendants declined
employees in the ESOP. 2 16 In contrast,
217
to participate through their union.
Initially, it appeared that the employees who participated in the
ESOP made a terrific financial decision. 2 18 Yet, over the long-term,
the ESOP did not solve the cultural problems at UAL. The UAL
ESOP was criticized as a "concept [that] was flawed from take-off.
The unions, especially the pilots union, soon realized that they could
extract more wealth from United by driving up salaries than by
growing the stock. '219 The participation of some, but not all, unions
220
stressed relations among the unions.
After UAL announced its interest in acquiring U.S. Airways, the
pilot's ESOP ownership did not discourage the pilots from imposing
substantial business costs on UAL in the summer of 2000.221 Pilots'
refusal to work overtime caused tens of thousands of flights to be
cancelled. 222 Most recently, in its struggle to obtain government
loans to avert bankruptcy in the wake of "9-11" and its effects on the
entire airline industry, UAL struggled to obtain concessions from its
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unions. 223
Even Corey Rosen, a strong advocate of employee
ownership and the executive director and co-founder of the National
Center for Employee Ownership stated that "giving stock to
employees was no cure for the company's long-embedded labor
224
animosity."
Employee ownership and participation may be one means
corporations can utilize to further internal democracy. To the extent
that the programs successfully contribute to such an objective they
also may provide employees with democratic skills for use outside the
workplace. And, workplace democracy may serve as a model for the
governance of the external community. Unfortunately, employee
ownership and participation programs will not serve as panaceas. If
instituted on a superficial level, then they may lead to increased
tension and frustration in the workplace and the community. They
will not necessarily resolve long-standing cultural problems within a
corporation.
Employees who experience the lack of success of
superficial or otherwise unsuccessful ownership and public programs
might question the value of democratic principles within and outside
the workplace.

V. REDUCING CONFLICT THROUGH EMPLOYEE VOICE

The previous sections considered the potential connections
between employee ownership and participation programs and
workplace governance. This Section will turn to possible connections
between those programs and communities where employees live and
work. Of course, both monitoring and the internal operation of
democratic principles also have effects on the communities where the
multinational corporations operate.
Also, the connections with
community in the context of employee voice and sources of conflict
will be analyzed.
A. Employee Voice
Employees may act as transmitters of norms between their firm
and the community. By providing information on local culture,
history, and expectations, employees may transmit knowledge to the
company that helps it avoid creating friction. For example, when a
multinational corporation establishes operations in a new location,
employees may explain subtle religious practices to foreign managers
as the employees voice their expectations of the workplace.
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Sensitized managers may consider those practices as they develop the
corporation's local strategies and engage with the local community.
Likewise, as ambassadors for the company to the community,
employees can increase the transparency of the company's culture
and intended community role.
As with most employee roles discussed in this Article, employees
can fulfill those functions in the absence of employee ownership and
participation programs.
Financial participation may increase
employees' incentives to exercise voice to avoid disputes or to address
them in productive ways. It also may encourage employees to act as
mediators, instead of standing apart, if misunderstandings occur.
Here, localized programs may be important so that employees can
realize the effects from their own actions on their financial
participation interests. A company-wide ESOP sponsored by a large
multinational corporation may result in such small ownership
interests for employees at a small outpost that the potential incentive
effects of ownership are negated.
Similarly, decision-making participation can help provide formal
avenues for employee voice. It also can discourage management from
ignoring employee voice. A formalized program could be especially
important in cultures where individuals do not have societal
experience in effective use of voice. It seems reasonable to expect
that a decision-making program may have to be localized in order to
develop participation skills and provide a mechanism where workers
can see an effect from the exercise of voice.
B. Sources of Conflict

225

The ideal way to combat conflict will probably be to eliminate the
root cause of conflict. Commentators have identified a variety of
fundamental societal problems that may lead to conflict. Fort and
Schipani discussed the "needs" and "security" theories, as well as the
connections between these theories and "ethics" theory, as being ways
of identifying conditions that lead to conflict. 226 Similarly, Tavis
discussed a "global social void of inequality and insecurity. '227 At the
center of this void, which is created by globalization and technology,
lies human rights violations. Other manifestations include inequality
in wealth distribution, economic instability, and opportunity for
human development. Tavis' consideration of human development
draws heavily on the work of Amata Sen. Tavis characterizes Sen's
five instrumental freedoms-political freedom, economic facilities,
social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective

225.
226.
227.

Fort & Schipani, supranote 15, at 390, 416.
Id. at 416-20.
Tavis, supra note 14, at 489.
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security-as sharing the common traits of economic accomplishment
228
and participation.
Employee ownership and participation programs might increase
access to the five instrumental freedoms in two ways. First, the
programs may directly affect the economic opportunity and
229
participation rights of employees who are program members.
Because these employees are community members, the programs will
affect community wealth quite directly.
As members of the
community, employees' non-workplace application of decision-making
and participation skills may directly impact the way the community
makes decisions and resolves conflicts.
Second, workplace ownership and participation programs may
have an indirect effect on community members who are not
employees. As employees spend enhanced income, or even as they
enjoy the wealth effect of inaccessible assets, the greater community
takes part in economic accomplishment.
Similarly, as employees
learn democratic skills, principled decision-making, and ability to
develop consensus in the workplace, those skills may spread to the
community through interactions with family, social, religious,
political, or other cohort groups.
C. The Cost of Superficial Programs
Communities may hold employees accountable for the perceived
effects corporations have on communities, whether or not employees
have a role in the relevant decision-making. Superficial employee
ownership and participation programs may enhance this designation
of responsibility by causing communities to believe employees have
substantially more power and voice within the corporation than
employees are able to exercise.
Employee ownership and
participation programs in these cases may give rise to a worst-case
scenario.
Communities expect more of their members who are
employees than those members can possibly achieve in representing
local interests within the firm. The end result may be to create
conflict between community members who are not employees and
those who are. In such an instance, the ownership and participation
program would have increased the level of conflict in the local
community.
Weirton Steel provides a slightly different example by
delineating how internal corporate struggles spilled over into the

228.
Id. at 519.
229.
Realistically, though, multinationals often engage labor in the leastdeveloped countries through a system of subcontracting or joint ventures. In those
situations, employee ownership and participation programs are unlikely to filter down
to the factories and facilities in countries where employees are most likely to be subject
to the social void.
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community. The Weirton community struggled to rationalize the
230
class conflicts that developed during the initial stages of the ESOP.
The long history of localism in Weirton arguable motivated the
that led to the mill's, and even
continuing employee compromises
23
perhaps the town's, survival. i
significance on the roles of economic
placed
Tavis
accomplishment and participation in eliminating sources of
conflict. 232 Looking first at economic accomplishment, employee
ownership and participation programs are not unerring vehicles in
the quest for economic enhancement and true exercise of employee
voice. Financial participation and ownership can concentrate an
employee's already significant job-related risk. These programs can
result in situations where employees lose savings and expected
deferred compensation, in addition to losing their jobs. The programs
in Egypt may have this effect because they are so heavily
concentrated in companies that could not obtain financing from
market sources. 233 Even where losses are due to legitimate business
circumstance, and not to management greed or outright fraud, the
concentration of losses may be devastating to the employee
This would have a concomitant effect on the local
population.
community, increasing the threat to economic accomplishment that
Tavis and Sen viewed as critical to instrumental freedoms.
Workplace participation programs may or may not result in true
participation of the type Tavis had in mind. Superficial quality circle
programs may not increase firm transparency in any significant way.
Nor by creating a mechanism for employee voice does it necessarily
follow that employees will be free to voice dissenting opinions or
engage management in dialogue. Varano argued that the EPS
program at Weirton Steel led to frustration because management so
frequently ignored workers' suggestions. Also, one might wonder
whether the voting rights that Russian employees received as part of
privatization programs had any effect on increasing participation, or
even relevant voting skills, since many employees allegedly have
transferred their voting rights to management or been commanded
how to vote. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to theorize that the
overall effect of employee ownership and participation programs in
the communities that encompass the employees probably depends on
the nature of the programs, the firm, and the community. Future
research could seek to define the characteristics of programs that
would be most likely to support employee voice, increase economic
accomplishment, and enhance participation.
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VARANO, supra note 10, at 330.
Id. at 332-36
Tavis, supra note 14, at 519.
See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
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VI. CONCLUSION

This Article attempts to identify potential connections between
employee ownership and participation plans with those principles
identified in the 2001 Peace Symposium as advancing sustainable
peace. Particularly in periods following economic crisis or major
conflict, commentators have looked to employee ownership and
participation programs as mechanisms to address the underlying
sources of crisis. Whether for economic or social purposes, or both,
countries throughout the world have established legislative
frameworks to encourage and support employee ownership and
participation programs. The scope and variation of programs used by
corporations throughout the world can be unpacked into three basic
participation
rights,
decision-making
dimensions:
financial
participation rights, and entry and exit rights.
Theoretically, programs that accord employees status as ownerparticipants allow a link between corporate governance and business
ethics with peace. Employees who are also owner-participants may
serve important corporate governance functions. As monitors of
management, they may root out corruption. They may ensure
multinational corporations consider the perspectives of employees
and their communities in corporate decision-making. In their roles as
owner-participants, employees may learn important skills for use in
developing democracies including the exercise of voting rights,
conflict resolution, reasoned advocacy, and acceptance of majority
determinations. These participation skills and potential economic
empowerment may carry over both directly and indirectly to the local
community.
The various types of programs result in complex relationships
among employees who are owner-participants, their employers, and
The multiplicity of implications from these
their community.
programs is inconsistent with a "one-size fits all" approach. 234 Much
work remains to identify and verify the ways in which ownership and
participation programs may serve different cultural, economic, and
industry needs. There is good reason to believe, however, that
employee ownership and participation programs can serve as one
useful mechanism for corporations that seek to enhance employee
voice and economic accomplishment.

234.
See Gordon, supra note 33, at 353 (suggesting that "companies will face
different information, credibility, commitment, and incentive issues" leading to
different approaches "to gain sharing and governance participation").
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